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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Published by the Undergraduates of theVOL X Washington University School of Law No. 2
THE RIGHT TO DIVIDENDS AS BETWEEN LIFE
TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN.
By J. Huoo GmRmM OF THE ST. Louis BAx.
The question as to the conflicting rights of life tenant and
remainderman to dividends on corporate stock has repeatedly
arisen and has resulted in the expression of widely divergent
views and irreconcilable decisions.'
It would seem that the purpose of the court in any case
would be to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
testator or donor, and so it is quite generally agreed that this
is what the courts aim to do, so far as practicable.
The difficulty occurs when the will or other instrument
creating the life estate and remainder directs the payment of
the "earnings" or "income" or "dividends" to the life ten-
ant, and is not sufficiently explicit for the guidance of the
court where the distribution by the corporation is of an un-
usual nature.2
Where the distribution is of the capital of the corporation,
as distinguished from surplus or earnings it is clear that it
1. 14 Corpus Jurls 829. Soehlein v. HoehnldM6 146 Wis. 88o. In re
Heaton, 89 Vt. 560.
2. 14 Corpus Jurls 83.
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goes to the remainderman, i. e., becomes a part of the corpus
of the estate. If, for instance, a corporation whose capital is
invested in three plants should sell one of them, distribute
the proceeds among its shareholders, and reduce its capital
stock accordingly, this distribution would go to the remain-
derman.
Suppose again that the corporation had sold one of its
plants at a profit, and then declared a dividend equal to the
profit, retaining the balance of the proceeds of sale; should
this profit be regarded as capital or income ? Since this profit
was the result of a mere enhancement in the value of assets
representing capital, and not a profit resulting from the op-
eration of the business it would also go to the remainderman.a
On the other hand where a corporation engaged in the
business of selling real estate, sold a part of such holdings
at a profit and distributed the same it was held that this dis-
tribution should go to the life tenant as income.4
All courts are agreed that as to cash dividends earned and
declared during the term of the life estate, whether ordinary
or extraordinary, are income and belong to the life tenant.
It frequently happens, however, that a cash dividend is
declared after the vesting of the life term which was earned
entirely before that term began, or in other cases was earned
partly before and partly after the beginning of the life term.
Where it is an ordinary cash dividend the courts hold quite
3. Kolphac' v. Clark, 133 Ia. 216. Poole -v. Union Trust Co., 191 Mich.
ar2. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201. Thayer v. Burr, 201 N. Y. 155.
Miller v. Payne, 160 Wis. 354.
4. Washington Co. Hospital Ass'n. v. Hagerstown Trust Co., 124 Ald.
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uniformly that the entire dividend goes to the life tenant as
income. The only exception seems to be New Jersey.5
When however, the dividend is not the ordinary dividend,
but an extraordinary dividend paid in addition to the regular
dividend and out of an accumulated surplus, there is a disa-
greement as to how such dividend is to be distributed as be-
tween the life tenant and the remainderman. Here three
classes of cases may arise; 1st where the entire extra dividend
has been earned before the vesting of the life estate but is
declared after such vesting; 2nd where it was earned partly
before and partly after the vesting of the life estate, and 3rd
where it was earned entirely during the life estate.
As to the third class there can be no question that the
dividend would go to the life tenant. But as to the other two
classes of cases there is some diversity of opinion.
It would seem that as to the first class the accumulation
should in equity belong to the remainderman, but the contrary
has been held in at least one case.6
In the case of Foard vs. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 7 how-
ever, it was held that surplus profits accumulated in the life
time of the testator, but divided after his death were part
of his estate, and not income which would go to the life tenant,
and this irrespective of whether the dividend was declared in
stock, cash or scrip.
Now this same difference of opinion exists with regard
to the second class of cases, namely where the extraordinary
5. Lanig v. Lang. 57 N. J. Eq. 325.
6. Richardson v. Richatdson, 75 Me. 570.
7. 122 Md. 416.
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dividend declared after the vesting of the life estate was
earned partly before and partly after the vesting of that es-
tate, and a discusion of the cases bearing upon this point will
explain the reasons for the disagreement with relation to
cases in the first class.
Massachusetts rule. The Mastachusetts court has adopted
the rule that whether a dividend is to be regarded as income,
and as such the property of the life tenant, or as capital be-
longing to the remainderman, is to be determined by the intent
of the action of the corporation in declaring the dividend; in
other words, if the action of the corporation manifests an
intention, so far as it is concerned, no longer to treat the sur-
plus profits as income, but to the extent of the (stock) divi-
dend as part of its permanent capital, the dividend as between
the life tenant and remainderman is to be onsidered as a dis-
tribution of capital which would go to tht remainderman;
but where the effect and intent of the declration is a per-
manent separation of its surplus profits to the amount of the
dividend, from the capital used in the business, it is to be con-
sidered as between such term holders, as income, going to
the life tenant.8
This view is held by the courts of a number of the States
as well as by the Supreme court of the United States, and the
English courts.9
Under the view held by these courts it follows that re-
gardless of the time the profits out of which they are made
& 14 Corpus Jurls 881.
9. tlelan4 vs. RaMe-, 102 Mass. 642. Gibbons vs. McMahon, "180 U.
S. 549. Smith vs. Dana, 77 Conn. 543. DeKoven vs. Alsop, 25 Ill. 809.
Humphrey vs. Lang, 169 N. C. 60L Netzort Trust Go. vs. Van Ranselaer,
32 I1. I. 281. Esiser vs. Mco7omber, 263 U. 6. 186. zone vs. ivans, 1 Chan.
23; 82L. J. Ch. Div. 12.
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accumulate, all stock dividends are to be considered as capital
going to the remainderman, and all cash dividends as income
going to the life tenant.
The logic of these decisions is briefly this; The directors
of a corporation determine what dividends are to be paid,
what earnings are to be put aside as surplus, whether the
whole or part of the surplus shall be used to expand the busi-
ness, and in general have the right to decide the policy of
the business. Under this view the life tenant could not claim
to own a portion of an undivided surplus.
Unless the directors declared a dividend the surplus re-
mains the property of the corporation. If it declares and
distributes this surplus as a dividend, then it goes from the
corporation to the stockholders; if this dividend is in cash
it is clearly a distribution of a portion of the assets of the
company. However, if the dividend is purely a stock divi-
dend then the corporation does not part with any of its assets,
none of its property is distributed to the shareholders, but
merely a certificate showing that he holds a larger number
of shares of stock of the company but the same proportionate
share he held before. To illustrate; if a corporation has been
prosperous and in addition to earning and paying its regular
cash dividend has accumulated a surplus equal to its original
capital and declares a stock dividend of 100% each stockholder
owning 50 shares would receive an additional 50 shares, but
not only would his proportionate interest in the corporation
be the same as before, but the inherent value of his 100 shares
would be about the same of the inherent value of the 50
shares originally held by him was before the increase. On
the other hand a dividend payable in cash or in property of
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the corporation would take from the corporation some of its
assets and turn them over to the shareholders. With the
declaration of the dividend and its payment the title would
vest in the shareholder, would be treated as income and go
to the life tenant.
While as appears from the cases above cited the Massa-
chusetts rule has been followed in a number of jurisdictions,
probably by far the larger number of Courts have rejected
the rule notwithstanding the fact that it has been approved
by the Supreme court of the United States.
The Massachusetts rule is largely one of practical conven-
ience, and does not always work out equitably, even though
it may be based upon sound reasoning, as to which there is
some question. And so we find other states following the
Pennsylvania Rule, which has been expressed in the following
language:
"The rule that whether an extraordinary cash dividend,
or a stock dividend, declared during the term of a life estate
in stock in a corporation is to be considered as income belong-
ing to the life tenant, or as capital belonging to the remainder-
man, is to be determined by the time, with relation to the com-
mencement of the life term, when the fund out of which the
dividend is made accumulated." 10
Under this rule the action of the corporation in deciding
the form of the dividend, whether cash or stock is not re-
garded as a determining fact, as in Massachusetts, but the
important consideration is "when was the dividend earned."
If prior to the vesting of the life estate it must be regarded as
10. 14 Corpus Jurls 832.
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capital and go to the remainderman; if after the vesting of
the life estate it would be income and go to the life tenant;
and if partly before the vesting of the life interest and partly
during the life estate it should be apportioned. This rule is
based upon considerations of equity and has been adopted in
the cases cited in the footnote."1  Soehnlein vs. Soe4nlein, a
very fully considered case, by a divided court refused to fol-
low the Massachusetts cases and the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Gibbons vs. McMahon, and in-
deed in the majority opinion rather severely criticized the
opinion in that case, saying that it was not only opposed to
the great weight of judicial authority, but that it was not based
on sound logic, and moreover produced results which were
inequitable. The Wisconsin court pointed out that the dis-
position of dividends depended upon the purpose and intention
of the donor of the stock, and that it was illogical to hold that
the action of the corporation could be permitted to nullify
that intention. And the Supreme court of Vermont has also
criticized the case of Gibbons vs. McMahon in In re Heaton's
Estate.12
However, the Supreme court of the United States has ad-
hered to the doctrine of the Gibbons case in the much later
case of Eisner vs. MacComber,18 a case in which the question
was presented in a different form however, namely whether
11. In re Osborn, 209 N. Y. 450. Holbrook vs. Holbrook, 74 N, H. 201.
Balletine vs. Young, 79 N. J. Eq. 70. Wallace vs. Williams, 9 S. C. 61.
In re Eaton. 89 Vt. 550. Duffill's Estate, 180 Cal. 748. Pritchett vs. Trust
Co., 96 Tenn. 472. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368. Thomas vs. Gregg, 78 Md. 545.
Wilberding vs. Miller, 88 Ohio St. 609. Soehnlein vs. Hoehnlein, 146 Wis.
330.
12. In re Heaton's Rstate, 89 Vt. 550.
13. Eisner v. MacCombe, 252 U. S. 189.
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an income tax must be paid on a stock dividend. In this case
there was a dissenting opinion, and it can be readily under-
stood that a feeling might exist that for purposes of taxation
a stock dividend should be considered income. However, the
majority of the Supreme court held that it was capital and
not income.
The question of the proper distribution of these extraor-
dinary dividends whether cash or stock as between life tenant
and remainderman, is an important and difficult one, and
strong reasons can be urged in support of the two doctrines
described as the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania doctrines
respectively. If I were to venture an opinion it would be
that the trend of decisions is toward the Pennsylvania rule.
The question has not as yet been adjudicated by any of the
Appellate courts of Missouri, but a case has recently been
decided in one of the circuit courts of the state, which in view
of the conflict of authority followed the decision of the Su-
preme court of the United States in Gibbons vs. McMahon,
supra, but the case is still pending on a motion for a new
trial, and in any event the question must be regarded as open
until passed upon by our Supreme court.
It may be added that while the early English rule gave
all extraordinary or unusual dividends, whether cash or stock
to the remainderman, treating them as capital and not in-
come, the more recent rulings in that country seem to be in
accord with the Massachusetts doctrine.14
14. Pari8 v. Pai8, 10 Ves. Jr.; 85 (1804) Old rule. Jones v. Evans, 1
Ch. 23 (1913).
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